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THE ACA, THE LARGE GROUP MARKET, AND CONTENT 
REGULATION: WHAT’S A STATE TO DO? 
AMY B. MONAHAN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act1 (“ACA”) significantly 
changes many aspects of health insurance regulation.  One of the primary, 
and overarching, changes made by the ACA is to regulate health insurance 
at the federal, rather than state, level.2  There is, however, at least one area 
of health insurance regulation that has been left almost entirely to the states: 
the regulation of the content of coverage in the large group market.3 
The term “content regulation” refers to regulation that requires health 
insurance contracts to provide coverage for certain types of treatments, 
services, or providers.4  State laws regulating the content of health insurance 
coverage are often referred to as “mandated benefits” or “state mandates.”5  
The ACA is not timid in its content regulation in market segments other than 
the large group market.  Indeed, every individual and small group policy 
issued in 2014 and thereafter will be required to provide coverage for all 
“essential health benefits” (“EHB”), a federally-defined term.6  Large group 
 
* Associate Professor and Vance K. Opperman Research Fellow, University of Minnesota Law 
School.  I am grateful to Dan Schwarcz for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article, 
and to the participants in Saint Louis University’s 2011 Health Law Symposium for a fruitful 
discussion of the issues raised in this article. 
 1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (to be 
codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).  The two preceding laws will be 
hereinafter cited together as the “ACA.” 
 2. See, e.g., ACA § 1201 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg). 
 3. I use the term “large group market” to refer to employer groups with fifty or more 
employees who do not self-insure their health plans. 
 4. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 727-28 (1985). 
 5. Gail A. Jensen & Jon R. Gabel, State Mandated Benefits and the Small Firm’s 
Decision to Offer Insurance, 4 J. REG. ECON. 379, 380 (1992). 
 6. ACA § 1201 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6) (adding PHSA § 2707); ACA § 
1302 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022).  As this article was going to press, the 
Department of Health & Human Services issued a bulletin announcing that it intended to let 
each state select coverage terms from among a group of benchmark plans to serve as the 
definition of “essential health benefits” within that state.  See CENTER FOR CONSUMER 
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policies face no similar requirements and can be freely regulated by the 
individual states.7  In that sense, the ACA retains the status quo in the large 
group market with respect to content regulation.  Given, however, the 
fundamental changes that are being made throughout the health insurance 
market, the ACA presents states with an important opportunity to give new 
consideration to the approach they take to content regulation in the large 
group market.  Giving careful consideration to large group content 
regulation is important not only because of new market dynamics that will 
come into play as the ACA is fully implemented, but also because employers 
in the large group market have an effective way to avoid such regulation by 
choosing to self-insure their health plans.  Self-insured plans cannot be 
regulated by the state,8 and therefore states must take care to balance the 
benefits of content regulation against the increased potential to self-insure 
that such regulation might create.  With these dynamics in mind, this article 
examines the benefits and costs of various state approaches to such content 
regulation, arguing that states should take this opportunity to fundamentally 
reform their approach to large group content regulation. 
II.  THE LARGE GROUP MARKET 
The “large group market” typically refers to the health insurance market 
segment that covers groups with more than fifty employees.9 The ACA, 
however, defines the large group market as those groups with more than 
100 employees, although states have the option in 2014 and 2015 to use 
the traditional fifty employee definition.10  This part will provide a brief 
overview of the large group market under both current law and under the 
ACA, whose major insurance market reforms will not be effective until 2014. 
 
INFORMATION AND INSURANCE OVERSIGHT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ESSENTIAL 
HEALTH BENEFITS BULLETIN (Dec. 16, 2011), http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/Files2/1216 
2011/essential_health_benefits_bulletin.pdf.  If the proposed framework is finalized, the result 
will be state-specific definitions of essential health benefits, a much different outcome than the 
federal definition that this article (and, arguably, the statute) presupposed. 
 7. See id.; see also Joe Touschner & Sabrina Corlette, Essential Health Benefits, AM. 
CANCER SOC’Y 3, http://www.acscan.org/pdf/healthcare/implementation/background/Essen 
tialHealthBenefits.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2011). 
 8. Am. Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358, 361 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 9. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, The Competitive Impact of Small Group Health Insurance 
Reform Laws, 32 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 685, 689 (1999). 
 10. ACA § 1304(b)(1) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18024). 
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A. Pre-ACA 
Prior to the passage of the ACA, the large group market was regulated 
by both individual states and the federal government.11  States regulated 
insurers offering large group coverage directly by dictating certain financial 
and consumer protection requirements.  States also regulated the content of 
such coverage, requiring that certain treatments, services, and providers be 
covered by every health insurance policy issued within the state.12  Large 
group insurance was regulated at the federal level, through the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended13 (“ERISA”), if the 
insurance was purchased by an employer for the benefit of its employees.14  
ERISA contains requirements relating to reporting and disclosure, fiduciary 
duties, claims procedures, and remedies.15  ERISA also includes several 
provisions applicable only to group health plans.16  For example, ERISA 
incorporates the provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) relating to non-discrimination in group 
health plans,17 and the requirement to offer continuation coverage for group 
health plan participants that experience a qualifying event.18  ERISA, 
however, contains very few requirements with respect to the content of 
coverage under a group health plan, specifying only that breast 
reconstruction following a mastectomy,19 minimum hospital stays following 
childbirth,20 and pre-existing conditions must be covered,21 and that mental 
health benefits, if offered, must be offered on the same terms as other 
medical benefits.22 
Notably, ERISA preempts any state laws that “relate to” an employee 
benefit plan.23  As a result, many state laws that would otherwise affect an 
 
 11. See Amy B. Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free Market? An 
Examination of Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1361, 1363-74 
(providing an overview of pre-ACA group health insurance regulation). 
 12. Id. at 1363-64. 
 13. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 
Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C. & 29 U.S.C.). 
 14. While it is possible that a non-employer would purchase health insurance coverage 
for a group, nearly all group health insurance contracts are purchased by employers and are 
subject to ERISA.  Notable exceptions include church and governmental employers, who are 
exempt from ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (2006). 
 15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021, 1101-1114, 1133, 1451. 
 16. Id. § 1161 & § 1181. 
 17. Id. § 1182. 
 18. Id. §§ 1161-1163. 
 19. Id. § 1185b. 
 20. 29 U.S.C. § 1185 (2006). 
 21. Id. § 1181. 
 22. Id. § 1185a. 
 23. Id. § 1144(a). 
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employer’s health plan are preempted. ERISA, however, saves from 
preemption state laws that regulate insurance.24  As a result, a state may 
regulate both the insurance company’s business operations, and also the 
substance of the policies issued by the insurer, which the employer in turn 
purchases.25  However, ERISA further provides that states may not regulate 
self-insured health plans as insurance companies.26  As a result, an 
employer that chooses to self-insure its health benefits does not need to 
comply with state insurance laws, including state mandated benefit laws.27  
The result is that insured employer plans must comply with both state and 
federal regulation, while self-insured plans need to comply only with limited 
federal requirements. 
A self-insured health plan is a plan in which the employer has retained 
the responsibility for paying claims.28  In some circumstances, an employer 
simply pays all claims out of its general assets, while in other cases the 
employer purchases stop-loss insurance that reinsures the employer’s risk of 
loss with respect to the plan above a certain “attachment point.”29  A plan 
does not lose its self-insured classification when it purchases stop-loss 
coverage, even if that coverage has a very low attachment point.30  In nearly 
all circumstances, employers who self-insure hire a third-party administrator 
to provide a network of physicians, to perform various types of utilization 
review, and to process claims.31  Rates of self-insurance vary by employer 
size, with large employers being much more likely to self-insure than small 
employers.  For example, in 2008, 88% of workers in firms with 3-199 
employees were covered by fully insured plans, while 89% of workers in 
firms with 5,000 or more employees were covered by self-insured plans.32 
The high rate of self-insurance among employers is not, in and of itself, 
problematic.  Rather, it is the possibility that differing content regulation 
between insured and self-insured plans drives the decisions of employers to 
 
 24. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). 
 25. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 728-29 n.2. 
 26. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). 
 27. See Am. Med. Sec., Inc., 111 F.3d at 360. 
 28. See id. at 364; Christina H. Park, Prevalence of Employer Self-Insured Health 
Benefits: National and State Variation, 57 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 340, 341 (2000). 
 29. See Russell Korobkin, The Battle Over Self-Insured Health Plans, or “One Good 
Loophole Deserves Another,” 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 89, 110-11 (2005). 
 30. Am. Med. Sec., Inc., 111 F.3d at 364. 
 31. Monahan, supra note 11, at 1372-73. 
 32. Health Plan Differences: Fully-Insured vs. Self-Insured, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. (Feb. 
11, 2009), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/FFE114.11Feb09.Final.pdf. 
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self-insure that causes concern.33  One primary cause for concern is that the 
differing content regulation will lead to inefficient self-insurance decisions. 34  
Consider, for example, an employer that desires to design a plan free from 
the state mandates that would apply to an insured plan.  That employer 
might decide to self-insure, even though it desires or may even need the 
financial protection associated with a fully insured product, and even though 
such a decision may result in higher administrative costs for the employer.  
Such decisions, caused by the regulatory disparity, create inefficiencies for 
the employer, and potentially expose the covered employees to undue risk.  
After all, in a self-insured plan if the employer is unable to pay claims, 
employees are limited to seeking payment in bankruptcy—where their status 
as unsecured creditors makes it unlikely they will be paid in full.35  I will refer 
to this risk as “insolvency risk.” 
A second concern fueled by the regulatory disparity between insured and 
self-insured plans is that employers will choose to self-insure in order to offer 
a less comprehensive plan than would be possible in the insured market.36  
If an employer’s self-insured plan fails to offer adequate coverage for 
employees’ medical expenses, employees may not be able to afford 
necessary medical treatment.  I refer to this form of risk as “treatment-
related financial risk.”  Unfortunately, little is empirically known about the 
extent to which differing content regulation drives an employer’s decision to 
self-insure,37 and data are similarly lacking regarding the extent of either 
insolvency risk38 or treatment-related financial risk39 that result from 
decisions to self-insure. 
 
 33. For an overview of this issue, see Gail A. Jenson, Kevin D. Cotter & Michael A. 
Morrisey, State Insurance Regulation and Employers’ Decisions to Self-Insure, 62 J. RISK & INS. 
185, 210 (1995). 
 34. Id. at 187. 
 35. See, e.g., Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, For Workers, Medical Bills Add to Pain As Firms Fail, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 6-7, 2008, at A1 (describing the effect of a company’s bankruptcy on 
individuals covered by the firm’s self-insured health plan). 
 36. Jonathan Gruber, State Mandated Benefits and Employer Provided Health Insurance 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4239, 1992). 
 37. For an overview of the literature on the decision to self-insure, see CHRISTINE EIBNER ET 
AL., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EMPLOYER SELF-INSURANCE 
DECISIONS AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AS 
MODIFIED BY THE HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010 (ACA), 1, 17-18 
(2011), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2011/LGHPstudy/EmployerSIDA 
CA.pdf. 
 38. See id. at 19-22. 
 39. See id. at 23-26 (discussing the coverage terms of insured versus self-insured plans 
and finding no significant difference in the actuarial value of the two plan types); see also 
Gruber, supra note 36. 
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B. Post-ACA 
When the ACA’s major provisions become effective in 2014, health 
insurance will continue to be regulated by both the state and federal 
governments.  However, several fundamental changes will be made.  The 
federal government will take a more active role in health insurance 
regulation, requiring among other things that insurers offer coverage to all 
applicants at prices that can vary based only on a limited number of 
factors.40  In addition, policies offered in the individual and small group 
markets must cover “essential health benefits.”41  This requirement to cover 
essential health benefits puts the federal government, for the first time, in the 
position of primary regulator of the content of coverage.42  States will 
continue to be free to regulate the content of health insurance coverage 
offered to their residents, but they must subsidize the cost of any mandates 
that exceed the essential health benefits package.43 
While large group policies must comply with the majority of the ACA’s 
health insurance reforms,44 the ACA engages in very little content regulation 
of such policies.  Large group plans will be required to cover preventive 
services with no cost-sharing,45 will be required to provide coverage for 
certain clinical trials,46 will be prohibited from imposing annual and lifetime 
limits,47 and will be limited in the overall cost-sharing they can impose,48 but 
such plans are not otherwise subject to any content regulation pursuant to 
the ACA.  In other words, the federal government will continue to leave 
nearly all content regulation of such policies to the states.  The one notable 
exception is that states have the option, beginning in 2017, to bring large 
groups within the state’s health benefit exchange.49  These state-based 
exchanges, which will become operational in 2014, are designed to 
organize, simplify, and regulate the individual and small group markets 
within a state.50  If states choose to allow large group policies to be offered 
within their exchanges beginning in 2017, the large group plans offered 
would be subject to the same regulation as the individual and small group 
 
 40. ACA § 1201 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg) (adding PHSA § 2701). 
 41. Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6) (adding PHSA § 2707). 
 42. Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Healthcare Reform by 
Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 138 (2011). 
 43. ACA § 1311(d)(3)(B) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031). 
 44. See ACA § 1201. 
 45. ACA § 1001 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13) (adding PHSA § 2713). 
 46. ACA § 10103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-8). 
 47. ACA § 10101 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11). 
 48. ACA § 1201 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6) (adding PHSA § 2707(b)). 
 49. ACA § 1312(f)(2)(B) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18032). 
 50. ACA § 1311(b)(1) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1)). 
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markets, including the requirement to cover all essential health benefits.51  
Absent a state’s decision to bring large groups into the exchange, a state 
will retain its role as the primary regulator of the content of large group 
plans, changing little about the status quo. 
III.  CONTENT REGULATION 
Regulating the content of health insurance contracts is controversial.52  
On the one hand, where the market fails to provide coverage for certain 
types of loses, content regulation can be necessary in order to provide 
insurance against such loses.53  And, we know, insurance coverage against 
a particular type of loss will often determine whether an individual has 
access to the related medical treatment.54  However, some object to content 
regulation on normative grounds, arguing that the government should not 
interfere with freedom to contract.55  Others argue that regulating the 
content of health insurance is economically inefficient and therefore welfare-
reducing.56  And many object to mandates not necessarily on normative 
grounds, but out of concern that the legislative process is unlikely, as a 
matter of institutional design, to lead to optimal outcomes.57 
One primary argument in favor of mandates is that they can be used to 
address market failure, particularly failures that result from adverse 
selection.58  Adverse selection, which refers to the phenomenon where 
individuals utilize private information in making insurance purchasing 
decisions, can occur at both the macro and micro levels with respect to 
health insurance.59  At the macro-level, adverse selection occurs when 
individuals who are more likely to require health care purchase health 
 
 51. See ACA § 1301 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18021). 
 52. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., PERSPECTIVES ON ESSENTIAL HEALTH 
BENEFITS: SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP (2011) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES], available at 
http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/Perspectives-on-Essential-Health-
Benefits-Workshop-Report/essentialhealthbenefits_workshophighlights.pdf. 
 53. See Amy B. Monahan, Value-Based Mandated Health Benefits, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 
127, 133 (2009). 
 54. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Thorpe & David Howard, Health Insurance and Spending 
Among Cancer Patients, HEALTH AFF., w3-189, w3-189-90 (Apr. 9, 2003), http://content. 
healthaffairs.org/content/early/2003/04/09/hlthaff.w3.189.full.pdf. 
 55. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS 
INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 7 (1995). 
 56. See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: 
Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21-36 
(1999) (providing an overview of efficiency-based objections to mandated benefits). 
 57. See, e.g., id. at 80-81. 
 58. See Monahan, supra note 53, at 133-35. 
 59. See id. 
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insurance more often than those with below-average health risk.60  When 
this happens, insurers raise their prices to reflect the worse-than-average risk 
of the insured population.61  As prices rise, only those in comparatively 
worse health will find insurance to be worthwhile, and the rising price and 
worsening risk level can theoretically continue until the market collapses.62  
But adverse selection can also occur at the micro-level.63  Assume there are 
two health insurance products offered on the market, one that covers mental 
health treatment and one that does not.  Individuals who know or have 
reason to suspect that they may need mental health treatment are of course 
likely to purchase the policy that covers the treatment, while those that are at 
low-risk for requiring mental health treatment will opt for the policy that 
excludes such coverage.  Where this happens, the insurer must price the 
policy that covers mental health benefits at a level that reflects the fact that 
the policy is being adversely selected by those with a high-risk of needing 
mental health treatment rather than at a rate that reflects community-
average risk.  If the adverse selection of the policy that includes mental 
health is strong, the marginal cost of the mental health coverage may in fact 
be equivalent to, or greater than, the actual expected cost of treatment.  
And where that occurs, insurance for mental health treatment essentially 
ceases to be available.64  A mandate for all health insurance policies to 
cover mental health treatment solves this problem, and makes coverage for 
mental health treatment available to all purchasers at community-average 
rates. 
The extent of adverse selection is, however, thought to be much less in 
the large group market as compared to either the small group or individual 
markets.65  In large part, this is due to the fact that employer-provided 
coverage receives a tax benefit that individual coverage generally does 
not,66 which lowers the effective cost of coverage, thereby encouraging 
 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See Monahan, supra note 53, at 133-35. 
 64. There is evidence that adverse selection does result in certain types of insurance 
coverage being unavailable.  See, e.g., M. Kate Bundorf, et al., Mandated Health Insurance 
Benefits and the Utilization and Outcomes of Infertility Treatments 2-5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 12820, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w 
12820.pdf (stating the insurance coverage for infertility treatment is generally not available on 
the individual market). 
 65. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, NAT’L ACAD. OF SOCIAL INS., THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE 
HEALTH INSURANCE 3-4 (2009), available at http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/ 
The_Regulation_of_Private_Health_Insurance.pdf. 
 66. See David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health 
Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 23, 31 (2001). 
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more low-risk individuals to elect for coverage under the group plan.  The 
fact that employers on average contribute very generously to coverage 
further lowers the effective cost of coverage for employees, leading more 
low-risk employees to accept coverage than if they faced the full premium 
cost.67  And finally, because the group that is insured is formed for reasons 
unrelated to the purchase of health insurance, the riskiness of the group is 
typically close to community-level risk.68  To put these factors in perspective, 
assume that a comprehensive individual health insurance policy, that 
includes coverage for infertility treatment, costs $7,000 per year and one 
that is less comprehensive and does not cover infertility treatment costs 
$5,000 per year.  Further assume that a comprehensive employer plan that 
also covers infertility treatment costs $6,000 per year due to decreased 
administrative expenses.  If the employer contributes $3,000 to the cost of 
coverage, employees will face only $3,000 in out-of-pocket premiums.  And 
because these premiums can be paid on a pre-tax basis, coverage would be 
even more affordable than compared to coverage of an equivalent cost in 
the individual market.  A low-risk individual eligible for the employer’s plan 
would elect for employer coverage, even though her preference, absent any 
subsidies, might be for the less-comprehensive individual policy.  Because 
the tax preference and employer subsidies entice low-risk individuals into the 
employer plan, adverse selection is of little concern in the large group 
market, even where the employer offers very comprehensive benefits.69 
The nature of large employer groups and their corresponding tax 
benefits suggests that there is perhaps little need to regulate the content of 
large group policies.  But the fact that low-risk individuals are likely to 
participate in large group plans does not actually tell us whether employers 
will make good decisions with respect to the scope of their plans’ coverage 
in the absence of regulation.  After all, there may be reasons unrelated to 
adverse selection that cause employers to make suboptimal coverage 
decisions.70  Studies comparing the content of coverage in the insured 
market versus the self-insured market have found that coverage terms do 
not vary significantly between the two,71 suggesting that employers might 
voluntarily cover those treatments and services that legislatures currently 
mandate.  These studies, however, do not establish causation.  It is difficult 
to discern whether self-insured employers voluntarily offer these benefits 
because they have come to independent decisions that it is in their and their 
employees’ best interest to cover such services, or whether it is because such 
 
 67. See id. at 32-33. 
 68. See id. at 32. 
 69. See id. 
 70. For a discussion of some of these causes, see Monahan, supra note 53, at 145-148. 
 71. See EIBNER ET AL., supra note 37, at 14. 
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employers must compete in the labor market with employers that offer fully 
insured plans that offer the range of mandated benefits.  The bottom line is 
that even if one supports mandates generally, there is a tentative case to be 
made that the need to regulate content in the large group market is less 
than the need in other market segments. 
IV.  STATE REGULATORY CHOICES POST-ACA 
Given that the ACA does very little to change content regulation in the 
large group market, one might wonder why there is a need to discuss a 
state’s regulatory choices post-ACA implementation.  After all, why not 
simply maintain the status quo?  Part of the answer to that query is that the 
large group market does not exist in a vacuum, and as other health 
insurance markets are changed dramatically, they will undoubtedly have an 
effect on the large group market.  States need to proactively consider and 
respond to these effects.  Additionally, relatively few interested parties 
appear satisfied with the status quo.  Given this dissatisfaction, and the 
significant changes taking place in other market segments, states have an 
important opportunity to revisit and reform their approaches to large group 
content regulation and thereby play an important role in health care reform.  
This part explores three such options: retaining the status quo, adopting the 
requirement to cover essential health benefits, or deregulating.  It concludes 
by suggesting that states should consider either requiring large group plans 
to cover the essential health benefits or adopt a hybrid approach that 
combines deregulation with process reforms designed to move mandates 
outside of the political process. 
A. Retain Existing State Mandates 
The easiest thing for a state to do, precisely because it involves no 
affirmative action, is for a state to retain its existing mandated health 
benefits as they apply to the large group market.  But aside from being easy, 
why might a state retain the status quo?  The obvious answer is that a state 
would retain the status quo if it is confident that its existing state mandates 
effectively address market failures, reflect sound health policy, or at least 
result from a process that tends to produce good policy outcomes. 
It is clear that mandates can serve hugely important health policy goals, 
and provide health insurance coverage for, and therefore access to, 
treatments that individuals could not otherwise access.  However, there is 
also evidence that the state legislative process does not always lead to such 
optimal outcomes.72  The legislative process simply may not be well-suited 
 
 72. See Amy B. Monahan, Fairness Versus Welfare in Health Insurance Content 
Regulation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
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to gather the types of evidence, and make the types of trade-offs that one 
would both want and expect in making such decisions.  Because legislative 
decisions often are not informed by robust information or evidence,73 my 
guess is that the vast majority of states are not currently in a position to 
adequately assess whether their mandates properly address market failures, 
further health policy goals, or rather make health insurance more expensive 
without meaningfully advancing such goals. 
Even if the benefits of mandates are hard for states to ascertain without 
further study, it is nevertheless helpful to think through the potential harms 
that might result from mandates when deciding whether to maintain the 
status quo.  There are at least two explicit harms that can be caused by state 
mandates.  The first is that mandates incrementally increase the cost of 
coverage, potentially decreasing the number of individuals who will elect 
such coverage.74  In other words, mandates can contribute to the problem 
of health insurance unaffordability.  I have argued elsewhere that focusing 
solely on affordability is unwise, given that large practical importance that 
the scope of coverage has with respect to providing meaningful insurance to 
individuals,75 but cost certainly is one piece of the larger puzzle that needs 
to be considered. 
The second potential harm that might result from mandates is that they 
may lead firms to opt-out of the insurance market, and instead elect to self-
insure their health plans.76  A decision to self-insure is not in and of itself a 
bad outcome, but does carry with it two risks that potentially affect 
employees, and one that potentially reduces a state’s revenue.  The risks to 
employees have been previously mentioned.77  The first is that mandates 
might lead some employers to self-insure despite the fact that they cannot 
adequately bear the corresponding financial risk. If an employer chooses to 
self-insure, but cannot cover the losses it is required to bear, the employer 
may be forced into bankruptcy, and participants may face unpaid medical 
plan claims.78  The second risk to employees is that their employer, when 
unrestricted by state mandates, might offer a health plan that offers 
 
 73. The California Health Benefits Review Program is probably the best example of a 
program that provides independent, extensive evidence regarding proposed mandates prior to 
a legislative vote.  For an overview of that program, see Susan Phillip, Overview and 
Commentary, 41 HEALTH SERV. RES. 991 (2006).  The extent to which that evidence influences 
mandate passage is unclear.  See Monahan, supra note 72. 
 74. See, e.g., David M. Cutler, Employee Costs and the Decline in Health Insurance 
Coverage, 6 FORUM FOR HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y 27, 40-48 (2003). 
 75. Amy B. Monahan, Health Insurance Risk Pooling and Social Solidarity: A Response to 
Professor David Hyman, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 325, 335 (2008). 
 76. See EIBNER ET AL., supra note 37, at 9-10. 
 77. See supra II.A. 
 78. See Dugan, supra note 35. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
94 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 5:83 
inadequate protection to employees with respect to certain types of health 
risks.  There is also a direct downside to the state that results from increasing 
rates of employer self-insurance, in the form of decreased premium tax 
revenue.  Nearly all states impose taxes on the premiums collected by 
insurance companies within the state.79  Some of the revenue lost by 
employers choosing to self-insure is partially regained if the self-insured 
employer chooses to purchase stop-loss coverage to reinsure the risk related 
to the self-insured plan.  However, stop-loss premiums, which only cover 
part of the risk associated with an employer’s plan,80 are lower than 
traditional health insurance premiums that cover all plan losses.81  As a 
result, the revenue from stop-loss premiums is lower than that which could 
be collected on traditional premiums.  Consequently, a state may be losing 
available revenue if its mandates are driving employers to self-insure their 
plans.  Unfortunately, just as there is a lack of data regarding mandates 
themselves, there is also a lack of clear evidence regarding not only the 
extent to which mandates drive employer decisions to self-insure, but also 
the extent of the financial risks and state revenue loss that might result from 
such decisions. 
Ideally, a state should balance the detriments of retaining existing 
mandates (lower premium tax revenue, potentially higher risk levels for 
employees, and potentially lower health insurance coverage rates) against 
the policy benefits that flow from the existing mandates.  If mandates are the 
only way to achieve important health policy goals, the decision would likely 
be easy.  But if mandates are of marginal policy value, it seems unwise to 
keep them in place.  Of course, in many states, the truth may lie somewhere 
in between.  Some mandates may very well make sense to keep, but others 
might not warrant their cost.  The problem is, of course, distinguishing 
between the two and getting state legislatures to act on such information to 
the extent it is available.  The current arrangement, where mandates are 
simply considered through the standard legislative process, appears to be 
poorly suited to the task at hand.  Part V below explores some alternative 
institutional designs for content regulation that may lead to improved policy 
outcomes, or at least better-informed decisions.82 
B. Adopt Essential Health Benefits for the Large Group Market 
Another alternative for states to consider is to eliminate existing state 
mandates, and instead simply require all insurers offering policies within the 
state, regardless of market segment, to offer coverage for essential health 
 
 79. See JOST, supra note 65, at 11. 
 80. See EIBNER ET AL., supra note 37, at 10. 
 81. See id. at 9-10. 
 82. See infra Part V. 
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benefits.  As an initial matter, the attractiveness of this option to a given 
state will likely depend on two factors.  The first concerns how, exactly, 
essential health benefits are defined.  Recall that essential health benefits 
are not defined by statute, but will instead be defined by the Secretary of 
HHS based on criteria contained in the ACA.83  If the definition established 
by HHS strikes most states and relevant stakeholders as providing the right 
balance of coverage and affordability, and is consistent with the state’s 
health policy goals, adopting the EHB requirement for the large group 
market may be quite attractive.84  Another primary consideration is whether 
the state plans to open its health insurance exchange to large groups in 
2017.85  However, many states are unlikely to make a decision about 
including large groups within the exchange until they are able to gauge the 
success of the exchange for the individual and small group markets. 
Regardless of whether a state intends to open its exchange to large 
groups, there are advantages to having the same coverage requirements 
across market segments, notably that doing so would diminish the likelihood 
of adverse selection between the markets.  Imagine, for example, that there 
is a requirement in the individual market to cover infertility treatment, but no 
corresponding requirement in the large group market in the state.  Assuming 
that employers do not voluntarily chose to cover infertility treatment, those 
who have reason to believe that they will need infertility treatment are likely 
to forgo employer-provided coverage and instead purchase coverage on the 
individual market, at least during the year or years the individual intends to 
pursue treatment.  When this happens, prices are likely to go up in the 
individual market, and down in the group market.  If just a few individuals 
make these choices, the effect will not be significant.  But if the essential 
health benefit requirements are much more generous than what is available 
in the large group market, adverse selection may be a significant concern 
and may threaten the viability of health care reform.86 
Another advantage is realized through a standard content requirement 
between the large group, small group, and individual markets.  If an 
individual loses coverage on the large group market, often the only (or at 
least the best) choice for the individual is to elect to continue coverage 
 
 83. See ACA § 1302 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022). 
 84. As of the time this article went to press, HHS had not yet promulgated proposed 
regulations defining the essential health benefits.  However, the Institute of Medicine has 
published a report making recommendations to HHS regarding the criteria and principles that 
should guide the determination of essential health benefits.  See INST. MED., NAT’L ACAD. SCI., 
ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: BALANCING COVERAGE AND COST (2011), available at http://books. 
nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=13234. 
 85. ACA § 1312(f)(2)(B) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031). 
 86. See Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 42, at 146-47. 
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under the employer’s plan.87  That, however, is likely to change beginning in 
2014, when the ACA’s insurance market reforms make individual insurance 
policies a much more attractive option than they are under current 
regulation.88  If the content of coverage was equivalent on the large group, 
small group, and individual markets, the individual would have more 
choices in the event of a loss of group coverage, without worrying that 
certain treatments and services would not be covered with individual 
coverage.  That does not mean that moving between the large group and 
individual market would be seamless.  The individual might need to change 
carriers, and be faced with both a different plan design and network of 
providers, but it would eliminate one important difference with respect to the 
scope of coverage.  Similarly, an individual who switched employment from 
a small firm to a large firm would enjoy a consistent scope of coverage if 
the essential health benefits definition applied in both markets and both 
firms chose a fully-insured plan. 
Given these advantages, why might a state hesitate in adopting the 
essential health benefit requirements for the large group market?  For one, if 
the scope of coverage required by EHBs is considered too broad, states 
might not want to adopt the requirements for fear that it will force even 
more employers into the self-insured market than under the status quo.89  
Relatedly, if the package of benefits is thought to be too expensive, states 
might not want to take actions that could result in fewer employees being 
able to afford coverage. 
Another hesitation might be unwillingness on the part of the state to 
cede control of health insurance regulation to the federal government.  
Again, the strength of this objection will very likely depend on how the 
essential health benefits process and resulting definition is viewed by the 
states.  It may also depend on how valuable state legislators view the ability 
to grant health insurance mandates.  If mandates are valuable (and free)90 
political favors, legislators may be hesitant to part with them.  Similarly, if 
states are not confident that the EHBs represent sound health policy, or if 
they are concerned that the framework that guides HHS in its decision-
making regarding EHBs is not dynamic enough to respond quickly to 
 
 87. See 29 U.S.C. § 1161 (2006) (describing an employee’s right to continue coverage 
under certain circumstances). 
 88. See Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 42, at 136-42 (providing an overview of the 
ACA’s impact on the individual market). 
 89. The potential effect of the essential health benefit requirements on small firms’ 
decisions to self-insure was enough of a concern that section 1254 of the ACA requires HHS 
to study the issue and report to congress.  The report by EIBNER ET AL., supra note 37, was 
commissioned by HHS to fulfill that statutory requirement. 
 90. See David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What’s Wrong with a Patient Bill of 
Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 221, 249 (2000). 
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changing market conditions, a state may be hesitant to use the EHB 
definition in the large group market. 
Surprisingly, as this article was going to press, the Department of Health 
& Human Services announced that it intended to let each individual state 
choose its own definition of “essential health benefits” from a menu of pre-
existing benchmark plans.91  States would be permitted to use the coverage 
terms under one of the following plans as the basis for its essential health 
benefits definition: (1) one of the top three small group products currently 
offered in the state, by enrollment; (2) one of the largest three state 
employee health benefit plans, by enrollment; (3) one of the largest three 
national Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan options, by enrollment; or 
(4) the largest non-Medicaid Health Maintenance Organization operating in 
the state.92  By allowing this type of choice, HHS will give states the ability to 
choose an essential health benefits definition that includes all existing state 
mandates without bearing any additional cost.93  As a result, a state will 
have the ability to both maintain the status quo in the large group market 
and provide consistency of coverage terms between the individual, small, 
and large group markets by choosing an essential health benefits definition 
that incorporates all existing state mandates. 
C. Deregulate 
Another option for states to consider with respect to content regulation 
in the large group market is simply to deregulate.  That is, to repeal existing 
mandates and allow purchasers in the large group market to have 
unrestricted choice in designing their plans.  The benefits, from a state’s 
perspective, are rather straightforward.  First, because the decision to insure 
or self-insure would no longer depend on differing levels of content 
regulation, employers should, all other things equal, be more likely to insure 
their plans then they are under the status quo.94  Prior to the ACA, there 
 
 91. See Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight, U.S. Dep’t of Health 
& Hum. Servs., Essential Health Benefits Bulletin (Dec. 16, 2011), http://cciio.cms.gov/re 
sources/files/Files2/12162011/essential_health_benefits_bulletin.pdf. 
 92. Id. at 9. 
 93. If a state selects a benchmark plan that is subject to existing state mandates, such as 
a small group plan, those state mandates would be required under the essential health 
benefits definition and not require the state to bear any cost associated with those mandates.  
States could also choose a definition, such as the federal employee option, that is not subject 
to state mandates.  If a state did so, and it retained its mandates in the individual and small 
group markets, it would have to pay any increased cost resulting from mandates that exceed 
the coverage of the federal employee plan selected. 
 94. Studies examining the effect of content regulation on the propensity to self-insure are 
mixed, so it is difficult to determine whether in fact rates of self-insurance would decline under 
deregulation.  See EIBNER ET AL., supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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were additional regulatory benefits to self-insuring that went beyond 
avoiding content regulation.95  In particular, self-insured plans did not need 
to comply with state insurance laws regulating matters such as external 
review of claims denials.96  The ACA, however, will require all employer 
plans, whether insured or self-insured, to comply with external claims review 
requirements, effectively eliminating the most valuable regulatory advantage 
to self-insurance outside of content regulation.97  The elimination of this 
regulatory advantage for self-insured plans should tend to increase the 
propensity to insure as compared to the status quo.  States could further 
encourage employers to insure their group plans by eliminating content 
regulation for such group plans.  By doing so, states would help prevent 
employers from choosing to self-insure solely to avoid unwanted regulation, 
and this should help to reduce the number of instances where an employer 
elects to self-insure despite being unable to bear the financial risks 
associated with a self-insured plan.  In addition, if rates of insurance go up 
in this market segment, state revenues received from premium taxes should 
rise as well.  This potential benefit could be hard to ignore at a time when 
many states are struggling to make ends meet.98 
Recall, too, that in the individual and small group markets, states will 
need to subsidize the cost of any mandates that exceed the essential health 
benefit requirements.99  Given most states’ strained fiscal position, it seems 
likely that states will simply eliminate any mandates in the individual and 
small group markets that exceed the essential health benefit requirements.  If 
states regulate the content of health insurance primarily to address market 
failures in the individual and small group markets, and they will no longer 
be regulating for such purposes, deregulation of the large group market 
may make even more sense. 
What might prevent a state from taking this action, which potentially 
offers better protection to consumers and more revenue for the state?  There 
are two main counter pressures, one noble and one less so.  First, giving up 
 
 95. See id. at 10-11. 
 96. See Nan D. Hunter, Managed Process, Due Care: Structures of Accountability in 
Health Care, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 93, 129 (2006). 
 97. EIBNER ET AL., supra note 37, at 41. 
 98. Elizabeth McNichol et al., States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact, CENTER ON 
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (June 17, 2011), http://www.cb pp.org/files/9-8-08sfp.pdf. 
 99. ACA § 1311(d)(3)(B) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031).  As noted above, the 
recent guidance from HHS concerning essential health benefits, if finalized in its current form, 
would allow a state to select an essential health benefits definition that incorporates all of its 
existing mandates, thereby negating the need for a state to pay any increased cost to retain its 
mandates.  See Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Hum. Servs., , Essential Health Benefits Bulletin (Dec. 16, 2011), http://cciio.cms. 
gov/resources/files/Files2/12162011/essential_health_benefits_bulletin.pdf. 
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on mandates in the large group market potentially means giving up on a 
very important policy tool.  Assume, for example, that a state decides to 
pursue deregulation in the large group market and all existing mandates are 
eliminated, including a mandate to cover diabetes self-management 
equipment and supplies.  Employers, then, would have the ability to design 
a health plan that excludes coverage for diabetes self-management.  They 
could make that choice whether they purchase an insurance policy to pay 
plan benefits, or if they chose to self-insure.  While many employers may 
voluntarily choose to cover diabetes self-management, others might not.  
Under the ACA, diabetic individuals whose employers did not offer self-
management coverage might be able to obtain appropriate coverage in the 
individual market, but that would mean losing several key advantages of 
employer-provided coverage and might not, therefore, be a viable 
option.100  The result might be that many diabetic individuals lack coverage 
for self-management supplies and either face an increased financial burden 
as a result or, worse, fail to follow their physician’s orders regarding self-
management.  Under a pure deregulatory approach, a state would not take 
action to remedy such a situation.  And the result might be that some 
individuals who would otherwise be covered within the large group market 
would need to obtain coverage through the individual market.  While the 
individual market might provide adequate coverage to such an individual, 
the individual would face higher costs for such coverage, and the state 
would have to be willing to accept that outcome if it wants to pursue a pure 
deregulatory approach. 
The other counter pressure against pursuing deregulation is the loss of 
mandates as a political tool.  As noted above, politicians may find 
mandates to be a very effective tool for providing political rents to 
constituents at very low cost.  As a result, politicians may be hesitant to give 
mandates up.  And even if an initial decision to deregulate is made, it is 
easy to imagine that under future legislatures the market might slowly creep 
back to regulation, when future politicians decide that a mandate is 
necessary.  In the end, it is difficult to determine whether a state would be 
 
 100. Contrast this example, dealing with a chronic disease, to that given in an earlier 
regarding the acute disease of infertility.  See supra text accompanying notes 68–69.  
Whereas an infertile individual without access to employer-provided coverage could 
potentially obtain coverage on the individual market for a limited period of time (say, up to a 
maximum of five years), in order to obtain the desired treatment, and still benefit financially 
despite the loss of the employer-subsidy for coverage, an individual with a chronic disease 
would need to permanently switch to exchange-based coverage.  This would mean giving up 
the employer’s subsidy at least until alternative employment that provided group coverage for 
the chronic condition was obtained, potentially imposing a much greater financial burden on 
those with chronic conditions not covered by an employer’s plan as compared to those with 
acute conditions that are not covered. 
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better off under a deregulatory approach.  On the one hand, deregulation 
might allow a state to increase its revenue and better protect against 
employer insolvency risk without significantly affecting health outcomes.  But 
it is also possible that a deregulatory approach to the large group market 
could leave many vulnerable individuals without affordable or adequate 
health insurance coverage. 
V.  AN IDEAL SOLUTION? 
None of the three alternatives discussed above is perfect.  Deregulation 
should provide the state with additional revenue and would solve the 
problem of employers choosing to self-insure in order to avoid mandates, 
but it might result in more employers offering health plans that do not 
adequately cover their employees’ health needs, creating treatment-based 
financial risk for such employees.  Retaining existing mandates is easy, but 
will continue the content regulation disparities between insured and self-
insured plans, and will create new disparities between content regulation in 
the individual, small group, and large group markets.  Further, these 
mandates might increase costs without meaningfully affecting health 
outcomes, although in most states this is difficult to determine because no 
systematic study of existing mandates has been undertaken.  Adopting the 
essential health benefits definition is very attractive if states are pleased with 
both the process and resulting definition adopted by HHS, but it is too early 
to tell whether that will be the case.  Given that each of the three options 
has flaws, how might a state proceed? 
One possibility is to start from scratch with respect to mandates in the 
large group market.  If a primary concern is that existing mandates result 
from an institutional design that is likely to result in suboptimal outcomes, it 
seems wise for states to reconsider that institutional design and move 
content regulation outside of the legislature.  The first step that likely makes 
sense is to remove content regulation from legislative control, and instead 
delegate authority either to an existing administrative agency or to an 
independent commission.  There is a large amount of literature on agency 
decision-making and institutional design that would be relevant to a 
decision between an agency or commission,101 but for our purposes it is 
sufficient to note that either approach is likely to have institutional 
advantages over a legislature. 
Simply changing the decisionmaker, however, will likely be insufficient to 
achieve fundamental reform of mandates.  Rather, a part of the new 
 
 101. See, e.g., TIMOTHY STOLZTFUS JOST, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., FRESH 
THINKING-LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES PRESENTED BY HEALTH CARE REFORM  2-3, 14 (2009), 
available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/legalandregulatoryissues.pdf. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] THE ACA, THE LARGE GROUP MARKET, AND CONTENT REGULATION 101 
institutional design should also be decision-making criteria and guidelines 
that force the decisionmaker to make the trade-offs that are required with 
respect to health insurance decisions.  Remember that one of the criticisms 
of the current legislative-based processes is that with them, mandates have 
little to no cost to politicians or the state government.102  Assume, for 
example, that the parents of a child with a debilitating medical condition 
discover that their health insurance excludes coverage for their child’s 
condition.  Further assume that the parents approach their state 
representative, and suggest that insurance companies should be required to 
provide the coverage that their child needs.  When faced with grief-stricken, 
financially-burdened parents, legislators may be very inclined to vote in 
favor of a mandate, particularly since the financial cost of such a mandate 
to the state is often non-existent.103  It is a cost that is born by invisible 
others.  Of course the mandate in my example might be necessary and well-
worth the cost, but it is also possible that in fact the medical treatment 
desired by the parents for their child has been shown to be ineffective.104  
The difficulty here is that even if the treatment at issue is necessary and 
effective, it might be the case that covering it would result in some people 
being unable to afford insurance.  The point is that the costs and 
consequences of mandates can be very real, but they often are not felt (or 
perhaps, even considered) by legislatures.105  This disconnect between the 
decisionmaker and the true costs of regulation would not be changed simply 
by making an agency or a commission the relevant decisionmaker.  In order 
to make a decisionmaker face a real choice (here, the desirability of certain 
coverage versus the cost of that coverage and its corresponding effect on 
health insurance affordability) it is critical that the decisionmaker be bound 
by concrete criteria.  Goals could be varied, but for example the criteria 
might include a requirement that the premium impact of required covered 
services be kept constant, which would require that any new mandate that 
increases premiums be accompanied by a simultaneous decision to remove 
a mandate of similar cost.  Or, a state could require that mandates may be 
passed only if there is evidence that the mandate would materially improve 
health outcomes in a cost-effective manner.  It is up to the state to decide 
what its priorities are with respect to content regulation, but regardless of 
 
 102. Hyman, supra note 90. 
 103. Mandates would result in a cost to the state only if the proposed mandate applied to 
the state’s Medicaid plan or the plan for state employees. 
 104. For an example of a mandate that was passed in several states despite a lack of 
evidence supporting clinical effectiveness, see RICHARD A. RETTIG ET AL., FALSE HOPE: BONE 
MARROW TRANSPLANTATION FOR BREAST CANCER 3 (2007). 
 105. See Monahan, supra note 72 (finding relatively little use of evidence by legislatures in 
considering mandates). 
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what those priorities are, it is important that they be reduced to criteria that 
can clearly guide the relevant decisionmakers. 
Once the decisionmaker and criteria had been established, there would 
be two potential methods by which to pursue content regulation.  The first 
would be to have the commission or agency review all existing mandates 
and decide whether they would be retained.  Another approach would be to 
repeal all existing mandates and then, in response to market conditions, 
consider “new” mandates as needed.  After all, we do not actually know 
how the large group market will behave in a world without mandates.  For 
example, if all mandates were eliminated, but it was then discovered that a 
significant number of diabetics were unable to obtain coverage for diabetes 
self-management expenses, the agency could consider a diabetes mandate 
in accordance with relevant criteria.  But regardless of the starting point, any 
mandates would need to be reviewed on an ongoing basis to ensure 
continued satisfaction of the relevant criteria and any proposed mandates 
would need to go through a rigorous review process.  It is probably clear at 
this point that the reform of institutional design would not by any means be 
simple, but if a state is unwilling to adopt the federally-defined essential 
health benefits, such institutional changes may be the best available 
alternative. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This article was written with the assumption that, pursuant to the terms of 
the ACA, HHS would play a leading role in health insurance content 
regulation and adopt a federal definition of essential health benefits for the 
individual and small group markets that could provide a good alternative 
for states to adopt in the large group market.  It now appears, however, that 
HHS will be anything but a leader or innovator in content regulation, instead 
simply allowing states to continue with the status quo despite its many and 
varied critics.  While the proposal from HHS may hamper innovation in the 
individual and small group markets, the good news is that states retain the 
ability to pursue reform in the large group market.  If a state desires to move 
away from the status quo, it might consider radically changing the process 
by which it regulates the large group market.  Rather than simply letting 
content regulation proceed through the standard legislative process, 
establishing a new institutional design that not only changes the 
decisionmaker, but also requires adherence to clear standards, would help 
address fundamental criticisms of state mandates and would lead to 
regulation that stands a much better chance of making a real difference in 
both coverage and treatment availability and access. 
 
